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Abstract
We construct quantum games from a table of non-factorizable joint probabilities, coupled with a
symmetry constraint, requiring symmetrical payoffs between the players. We give the general result
for a Nash equilibrium and payoff relations for a game based on non-factorizable joint probabilities,
which embeds the classical game. We study a quantum version of Prisoners’ Dilemma, Stag Hunt,
and the Chicken game constructed from a given table of non-factorizable joint probabilities to find
new outcomes in these games. We show that this approach provides a general framework for both
classical and quantum games without recourse to the formalism of quantum mechanics.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As an established branch of mathematics, game theory [1, 2] analyzes strategic decision
making of competing agents who find themselves in conflict situations. Game theory finds
extensive applications in social sciences, biology and engineering. Recent developments in
quantum computing and quantum information theory [3] have motivated efforts to recast
classical game theory using quantum probability amplitudes [4], leading to the birth of the
area of quantum games [5–37] . Quantum games have been proposed [7] as a new way to
approach quantum algorithms, including speculation that nature may be playing quantum
games at the molecular level [38].
In the area of quantum games, a recently reported [31] probabilistic approach constructs
them from a set of non-factorizable joint probabilities. It is a set that cannot be factorized
in terms of other more fundamental probabilities. The motivating idea being that Bell’s
inequalities can be violated by a set of non-factorizable probabilities, though this does not
imply that any non-factorizable set will violate the inequalities. As the violation of Bell’s
inequalities is considered a fundamentally quantum aspect, one is motivated to have an
approach to quantum games that constructs them from the property of a probability set
of being non-factorizable. This then provides greater mathematical generality for quantum
games, providing accessibility without the formalism of quantum mechanics.
The earliest quantization attempts [8] were focussed at the two-player two-strategy (2×2)
non-cooperative games . The playing of a 2×2 game can be easily realized if players share a
physical system that involves 4 joint probabilities. This, for instance, will be the case when
players share two coins that can be put in head (H) and tail (T ) states. A referee gives
each player a coin and asks them to flip it to either the H or the T state. As no tossing but
only flipping actions are involved, it does not matter if the coins are biased or not. After
a players’ flipping (or not-flipping) actions the coins can be found in a HH, HT , T H, or
T T state, where the first entry in each pair, is reserved for the state of Alice’s coin. From
a given 2× 2 game table, the referee can then award players their payoffs depending on the
state of the two coins.
The probabilistic approach to quantum games developed in Ref. [31] extends the playing
of a 2×2 game towards the quantum domain by considering two players who share a bigger
physical system that also involves coin tossing. Consider four biased coins that two players
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share to play a 2 × 2 game according to the following arrangement. In a run, each player
is given two coins and she/he has to select one. The referee tosses the two selected coins
together and records the outcome. It can then be shown that the players’ payoffs, in a
mixed-strategy version of the 2×2 game, can be expressed in terms of their strategic choices
performed over multiple runs and the relevant 16 factorizable joint probabilities.
In order to maintain the bilinear payoff structure of the 2×2 game, constraints are placed
on joint probabilities. Allowing joint probabilities to become non-factorizable, while they
remain under these constraints, ensures that the classical payoffs and the outcome of the
game are obtained when the probabilities become factorizable.
In the present paper, we introduce an extra condition requiring that the considered
joint probabilities are also symmetric both when they are factorizable and non-factorizable.
We argue that this is a natural constraint to be included in a probabilistic approach to
quantum games that builds them from non-factorizable joint probabilities. We find that this
constraint further narrows down our focus in obtaining a quantum game from probabilistic
considerations only. We study quantum versions of the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game, the
Stag Hunt (SH) game, and the Chicken game [1, 2] within this approach that constructs
them from not only non-factorizable but also symmetric joint probabilities. We investigate
how non-factorizable and symmetric joint probabilities permit new equilibria in these games.
By introducing parameters that present a measure of non-factorizability, we discuss a novel
way of obtaining a set of non-factorizable joint probabilities, which allows us to identify
factorizable, non-factorizable, and the quantum domains.
II. AN APPROACH TOWARDS EXTENDING A 2× 2 GAME
We begin with the table of sixteen joint probabilities as shown in Table I.
For Alice and Bob we also have payoff matrices given by
A = Alice
S1
S2
Bob
S ′
1
S ′
2
 a1 a2
a3 a4

, B = Alice S1
S2
Bob
S ′
1
S ′
2
 b1 b2
b3 b4

, (2)
giving Alice’s and Bob’s payoffs, respectively. Because we are considering games with sym-
metrical payoffs we have B = AT , where T indicates transpose. This requires
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Alice
S1
+1
−1
S2
+1
−1
Bob
S′
1
+1 −1
S′
2
+1 −1
p1 p2
p3 p4
p5 p6
p7 p8
p9 p10
p11 p12
p13 p14
p15 p16
(1)
TABLE I: General probability table.
b1 = a1, b2 = a3, b3 = a2, b4 = a4. (3)
In a mixed-strategy game one has the strategy vectors x = (x, 1 − x)T and y = (y,1 − y)T ,
with x, y ∈ [0, 1] giving the probabilities for Alice and Bob to choose S1 and S ′1 respectively.
Payoff relations in a mixed-strategy game are
ΠA,B(x, y) = x
T (A,B)y, (4)
where subscripts A and B refer to Alice and Bob, respectively. In this notation we can, for
instance, have the pure strategy payoffs ΠA(S1, S
′
1
) = ΠA(1, 1) = a1 = ΠB(1, 1) etc. We
represent strategies x and y by numbers x and y respectively and note that the strategy
pair (x⋆, y⋆) is a Nash equilibrium (NE) when
ΠA(x
⋆, y⋆)− ΠA(x, y⋆) ≥ 0, ΠB(x⋆, y⋆)− ΠB(x⋆, y) ≥ 0. (5)
A possible physical realization for playing this symmetric game uses two coins in the
following arrangement. The referee announces the association S1, S
′
1
∼ H and S2, S ′2 ∼ T
and each player’s strategy consists of secretly flipping his/her penny either to the H or to
the T state. The players then simultaneously return their pennies to the referee. The referee
observes the state of the two coins and rewards the players. In the case of pure strategies
the referee can use the matrices (2) and in case of mixed strategies, the players are rewarded
according to the payoff relations (4).
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As mentioned in the introduction, the referee can also have a different arrangement that
allows the playing the game using four coins instead of two, as follows. S/he identifies the
four coins as S1, S2;S
′
1
, S ′
2
(note that S1 and S2 are no longer a player’s actions to put his/her
penny in H or T state). In a run s/he gives coins S1, S2 to Alice and coins S ′1, S ′2 to Bob.
Each player now has to choose one out of the two coins so that the chosen pair is one of the
(S1, S
′
1
), (S1, S
′
2
), (S2, S
′
1
), (S2, S
′
2
). The players return the two chosen coins to the referee
who tosses them together and records the outcome. The referee then collects four coins
(two tossed and two untossed) and prepares them for the next run. In this extended game,
players’ payoff relations can now be defined by making the association H ∼ +1 & T ∼ −1
and using the 16 joint probabilities p1, p2, ...p16, as described in Table (I).
We write the payoffs relations as,
ΠA,B(S1, S
′
1
) =
∑
4
i=1(a, b)ipi, ΠA,B(S1, S
′
2
) =
∑
8
i=5(a, b)i−4pi,
ΠA,B(S2, S
′
1
) =
∑
12
i=9(a, b)i−8pi, ΠA,B(S2, S
′
2
) =
∑
16
i=13(a, b)i−12pi, (6)
where ΠB(S2, S
′
1
), for instance, corresponds when Alice selects her S2 coin and Bob selects
his S ′
1
coin over all the runs. In Eqs. (6) each of the four payoff relations give mixed-
strategy payoffs of the 2×2 game. Over many runs, the players can also select a probability
distribution over the available strategies and one can define
ΠA,B(x, y) = x
T

ΠA,B(S1, S
′
1
) ΠA,B(S1, S
′
2
)
ΠA,B(S2, S
′
1
) ΠA,B(S2, S
′
2
)

y, (7)
where x ∈ [0, 1] is the probability with which Alice selects coins S1 and y ∈ [0, 1] is the
probability with which Bob selects coin S ′
1
. Eqs. (7) give mixed-strategy payoffs in an
extension of the original 2 × 2 game. As discussed in Refs. [31, 33, 35], this extension
involving 16 joint factorizable probabilities can be considered a re-expression of the classical
game that transforms the original game in such a way that a transition to the quantum game
is achievable by a consideration of non-factorizable joint probabilities. This re-expressed
game with factorizable probabilities is of course classically implementable and is not to be
confused with the original game from which it is derived.
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A. Obtaining a symmetric game
Enforcing game symmetry, under the interchange of players, we require ΠA(Si, S
′
j) =
ΠB(Sj, S
′
i) and thus we note from Eqs. (6) that this is achievable if
p2 = p3; p5 = p9, p6 = p11, p7 = p10, p8 = p12; p14 = p15. (8)
With this we produce Table (II) and notice that the table of probabilities is now symmetric
across the main diagonal. By including the normalization constraint on each quadrant, we
Alice
S1
+1
−1
S2
+1
−1
Bob
S′
1
+1 −1
S′
2
+1 −1
p1 p2
p2 p4
p5 p6
p7 p8
p5 p7
p6 p8
p13 p14
p14 p16
(9)
TABLE II: Symmetric probability table.
produce Table (III).
Alice
S1
+1
−1
S2
+1
−1
Bob
S′
1
+1 −1
S′
2
+1 −1
p1 p2
p2 1− δ1
p5 p6
1− δ2 p8
p5 1− δ2
p6 p8
p13 p14
p14 1− δ3
, (10)
TABLE III: Symmetric normalised probability table. Here δ1 = p1 + 2p2, δ2 = p5 + p6 + p8, and
δ3 = p13 + 2p14.
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This arrangement for playing a 2×2 game with 16 joint probabilities facilitates a transition
to playing the same game using an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) type setup [4, 40–43].
In this setup, Alice and Bob are spatially separated and are unable to communicate with
each other. In an individual run, both receive one half of a pair of particles originating from
a common source. In the same run of the experiment, both choose one from two given (pure)
strategies. These strategies are the two directions in space along which spin or polarization
measurements can be made. Keeping the notation for the coins, we denote these directions to
be S1, S2 for Alice and S
′
1
, S ′
2
for Bob. Each measurement generates +1 or−1 as the outcome,
as it is the case with coins after their toss in the four-coin setup. Experimental outcomes
are recorded for a large number of individual runs and payoffs are awarded according to the
directions the players choose over many runs (defining their strategies), the matrix of the
game they play, and the statistics of the measurement outcomes.
When pi (1 ≤ i ≤ 16) are taken as the EPR probabilities, they of course satisfy the
normalization constraint, stating that the sums
∑
4
i=1 pi,
∑
8
i=5 pi,
∑
12
i=9 pi, and
∑
16
i=13 pi are
all equal to 1. EPR probabilities also satisfy other constraints imposed by the requirements of
causality, stating that Alice’s outcome of +1 or −1 (obtained along S1 or S2) is independent
of whether Bob chooses S ′
1
or S ′
2
, and similarly Bob’s outcome of +1 or −1 (obtained along
S ′
1
or S ′
2
) is independent of whether Alice chooses S1 or S2. This can be written as
p1 + p2 = p5 + p6, p1 + p3 = p9 + p11,
p9 + p10 = p13 + p14, p5 + p7 = p13 + p15,
p3 + p4 = p7 + p8, p11 + p12 = p15 + p16,
p2 + p4 = p10 + p12, p6 + p8 = p14 + p16,
(11)
which is also referred to as the causal communication constraint [43]. These provide two
more dependencies giving p6 = p1 + p2 − p5 and p8 = p14 + p16 − p6.
Note that the causal communication constraints (11) are set into two groups. The first
group states that the probability of obtaining a particular outcome (+1 or −1) on Alice’s
side of the EPR type apparatus is independent of which one of the two measurements
are performed on Bob’s side. Similarly, the second group states that the probability of
obtaining a particular outcome (+1 or −1) on Bob’s side of the EPR type apparatus is
independent of which one of the two measurements are performed on Alice’s side. These
constraints hold even when Alice and Bob share an entangled state, and the non-factorizable
probability sets we consider below to construct quantum games always respect the causal
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communication constraints. The causal communication constraint is also sometimes referred
to as ‘parameter independence’, ‘simple locality’,‘signal locality’ or ‘physical locality’ and
prevents the acausal exchange of classical information between different parts of a quantum
system. This fundamental constraint is therefore retained even for the cases when the
probabilities become non-factorizable.
Substituting these relations we finally obtain the probability table for symmetric games
given by Table (IV) in terms of the five independent variables p1, p2, p5, p13, p14.
Alice
Bob
S1
+1
−1
S′
1
+1 −1
p1 p2
p2 1− δ1
S′
2
+1 −1
p5 δ6
δ5 1− δ4
S2
+1
−1
p5 δ5
δ6 1− δ4
p13 p14
p15 1− δ3
(12)
TABLE IV: Symmetric normalised causal probability table. Here δ4 = p1 + p2 − p5 + p13 + p14,
δ5 = −p5 + p13 + p14, and δ6 = p1 + p2 − p5
If x, y ∈ [0, 1] are defined to be the probability to select S1 over S2 and S ′1 over S ′2 by
Alice and Bob respectively, then we have Alice’s expected payoff given by
ΠA(x, y) = xyΠA(S1, S
′
1
)+x(1−y)ΠA(S1, S ′2)+(1−x)yΠA(S2, S ′1)+(1−x)(1−y)ΠA(S2, S ′2).
(13)
Bob’s payoff is then obtained from above by interchanging x and y. Substituting Eqs. (6)
and re-arranging we find
ΠA(x, y) = xy∆3v3 + x(∆1v1 −∆2v2) + y{(a2 − a1)v1 + (a3 − a4)v2}
+ a1p13 + (a2 + a3)p14 + a4(1− p13 − 2p14), (14)
where ∆1 = a3 − a1, ∆2 = a4 − a2 and ∆3 = ∆2 −∆1 with
v1 = w, v2 = u+ v, v3 = u+ w, (15)
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where u = p1 − p5, v = p2 − p14 and w = p13 − p5. By symmetry we also have for Bob
ΠB(x, y) = xy∆3v3 + y(∆1v1 −∆2v2) + x{(a2 − a1)v1 + (a3 − a4)v2}
+ a1p13 + (a2 + a3)p14 + a4(1− p13 − 2p14). (16)
For a NE we need to satisfy the relations
ΠA(x
∗, y∗)− ΠA(x, y∗) = (x∗ − x)[y∗∆3v3 +∆1v1 −∆2v2] ≥ 0
ΠB(x
∗, y∗)− ΠB(x∗, y) = (y∗ − y)[x∗∆3v3 +∆1v1 −∆2v2] ≥ 0. (17)
We thus have the NE defined for symmetric games with the three variables v1, v2, v3.
B. When probabilities are factorizable
If the probability table is factorizable then we can write
p1 = rr
′, p2 = r(1− r′), p3 = r′(1− r), p4 = (1− r)(1− r′)
p5 = rs
′, p6 = r(1− s′), p7 = s′(1− r), p8 = (1− r)(1− s′)
p9 = sr
′, p10 = s(1− r′), p11 = r′(1− s), p12 = (1− s)(1− r′)
p13 = ss
′, p14 = s(1− s′), p15 = s′(1− s), p16 = (1− s)(1− s′), (18)
where r, s, r′, s′ ∈ [0, 1] and r = p1 + p2 and s = p13 + p14. From symmetry we have p2 = p3
which immediately implies r = r′ and also s = s′ from p14 = p15.
Alice
Bob
S1
+1
−1
S′
1
+1 −1
r2 r(1− r)
r(1− r) (1− r)2
S′
2
+1 −1
rs r(1− s)
s(1− r) (1− r)(1− s)
S2
+1
−1
sr s(1− r)
r(1− s) (1− s)(1− r)
s2 s(1− s)
s(1− s) (1− s)2
(19)
TABLE V: Factorizable probabilities.
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So we can now find from Eqs. (15) v1 = −s(r− s), v2 = (r− s)(1− s) and v3 = (r− s)2.
Substituting these results into Eq. (17) gives the following conditions for the strategy pair
(x∗, y∗) to be a NE
ΠA(x
∗, y∗)− ΠA(x, y∗) = (x∗ − x)(r − s)[∆3{y∗r + (1− y∗)s} −∆2] ≥ 0, (20)
ΠB(x
⋆, y⋆)− ΠB(x⋆, y) = (y∗ − y)(r − s)[∆3{x∗r + (1− x∗)s} −∆2] ≥ 0. (21)
These are the defining equations for a NE when assuming symmetry and factorizability.
For Alice, we have the payoff in the factorizable case
ΠA(x, y) = xy∆3(r − s)2 + x(r − s)(∆3s−∆2) + y(r − s)(∆3s+ a3 − a4)]
+ a4 − s(∆2 − a3 + a4) + ∆3s2 (22)
and a similar expression for Bob is obtained by exchanging x for y.
C. Obtaining the classical mixed strategy game
To achieve the classical payoff structure we see from the first term in Eq. (22) that
(r − s)2 = 1, which requires r = 1 and s = 0 to give the payoff
ΠA(x, y) = a4 + x(a2 − a4) + y(a3 − a4) + xy(a1 − a2 − a3 + a4), (23)
giving the required classical bilinear payoff structure, which has associated NE given by
(x∗ − x)[∆3y∗ −∆2] ≥ 0. (24)
1. Prisoners’ Dilemma
For the PD game we have ∆1,∆2 > 0 and hence |∆3| ≤ ∆2. This makes the term in the
square bracket in Eq. (20) and Eq. (21) to be always negative, hence we just require r > s if
(x∗, y∗) = (0, 0) is to exist as a NE. The condition r > s implies that the coins are basically
in a heads up state, which is obviously reasonable because if we invert the coins before the
game then we invert the NE. This shows that symmetry and factorizability along with the
condition r > s will return the classical NE for the PD game.
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2. Stag Hunt
For the SH game we have ∆3 > ∆2 > 0 and ∆1 +∆2 > 0 and ∆3 > ∆1 +∆2. For mixed
NE we require from Eq. (20) y∗∆3(r − s) + ∆3s−∆2 = 0 or
y∗ = (∆2/∆3 − s)/(r − s). (25)
Because, by definition, y∗ ≥ 0 then this requires s ≤ ∆2/∆3 and similarly because y∗ ≤ 1
then [∆2 − s∆3]/[∆3(r − s)] ≤ 1 or ∆2 ≤ ∆3r or
r ≥ ∆2/∆3. (26)
To create the classical mixed NE in the classical game, we define r = ∆2/∆3+(1−∆2/∆3)g
where g ∈ (0, 1] and s = ∆2/∆3(1−h) where h ∈ (0, 1]. This gives us (∆2/∆3−s)/(r−s) =
∆2/∆3 or h∆2/∆3/((1−∆2/∆3)g+∆2/∆3h) = ∆2/∆3 or that g = h. This result indicates
that r and s are a proportional distance from ∆2/∆3. This then gives that
s =
1− r
∆3/∆2 − 1 . (27)
For the other NE, (x∗, y∗) = (0, 0), if we have y∗ = 0 then we require from Eq. (20)
ΠA(x
∗, y∗)−ΠA(x, y∗) = 1
2
(x∗ − x)(r − s)[∆3s−∆2] ≥ 0, (28)
and in order to return x∗ = 0 requires s < ∆2/∆3. Also, if we have y
∗ = 1 then we require
ΠA(x
∗, y∗)− ΠA(x, y∗) = 1
2
(x∗ − x)(r − s)[∆3r −∆2] ≥ 0, (29)
and in order to return x∗ = 1 requires r > ∆2/∆3. Hence we find three NE
(x∗, y∗) = (0, 0)
(x∗, y∗) = (∆2/∆3,∆2/∆3)
(x∗, y∗) = (1, 1) (30)
conditional on Eq. (26) and Eq. (27). We know 0 < ∆2/∆3 < 1, hence we can always find
an r and an s to create this particular classical game.
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3. Chicken game
For the Chicken game we have ∆3 = −(α + β) < 0 and ∆2 = −α < 0 and ∆1 = β > 0,
where α, β > 0. The general condition for NE is obtained from Eq. (20) as
1
2
(x∗ − x)(r − s)[−y∗(α + β)(r − s)− (α + β)s+ α] ≥ 0. (31)
We can see that ∆2/∆3 = α/(α+ β) hence we will duplicate the results of the previous SH
game, obtaining the correct classical NE
(x∗, y∗) = (1, 0)
(x∗, y∗) = (α/(α + β), α/(α+ β))
(x∗, y∗) = (0, 1) (32)
provided r > α/(α+ β) and s = (1− r)/{(α+ β)/α− 1}.
4. Discussion
We find α/(α + β) = ∆2/∆3 = (a4 − a2)/(a4 − a2 − a3 + a1), hence for the three games
studied, if we select r such that (a4−a2)/(a4−a2−a3+a1) < r ≤ 1 with s given by Eq. (27),
in each case we will return the classical NE for these three games when the probability table
becomes factorizable, although not the classical bilinear payoffs. If we also require this payoff
structure, then we require the more restrictive constraint r = 1 and s = 0.
III. EXTENSION TOWARDS NON-FACTORIZABLE JOINT PROBABILITIES
We have shown that factorizability along with symmetry and the conditions r = 1 and
s = 0 embeds the classical game within the quantum game. If we enforce r = p1+ p2 = 1 in
the general quantum game, then we have p3 = p4 = 0 by normalization, but by symmetry
p2 = 0, and therefore p1 = 1, similarly for the rest of the table. Hence this condition creates
the table of factorizable probabilities with p1 = p6 = p11 = p16 = 1 and all other probabilities
zero.
However we can still create a non-factorizable set of probabilities by inserting offset
parameters from the starting position in the Table (V). We now add extra parameters into
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Table V exploiting any available degrees of freedom. For the upper left quadrant because
we are constrained by normalization, symmetry, and the causal communication constraint,
we only have available two degrees of freedom. This is utilized with the parameters a and b
as shown in Table (VI). We then continue this process and we find that we can add up to
5 independent parameters, a, b, c, d, e ∈ ℜ in the range [−1, 1].
Alice
Bob
S1
+1
−1
S′
1
+1 −1
r2 − a− 2b r(1− r) + b
r(1− r) + b (1 − r)2 + a
S′
2
+1 −1
rs+ e r(1− s)− a− b− e
s(1− r) + d+ c− e (1− r)(1− s) + η
S2
+1
−1
sr + e s(1− r) + c+ d− e
r(1− s)− a− b− e (1− s)(1− r) + η
s2 + c s(1− s) + d
s(1− s) + d (1− s)2 − c− 2d
.
(33)
TABLE VI: Parameterizing non-factorizability.
In Table (VI) η = a + b + e − c − d, and a, b, c, d, e chosen such that each one of the 16
probabilities in Table (VI) remains in the range [0, 1].
From Table (VI) and Eqs. (15) we find
v1 = −s(r − s)− ǫ1, v2 = (1− s)(r − s)− ǫ2, v3 = (r − s)2 − ǫ3 (34)
and we can parameterize the NE in terms of the three parameters ǫ1 = e−c, ǫ2 = a+b+d+e
and ǫ3 = a+ 2b− c+ 2e. Substituting v1, v2, v3 into Eq. (17) we find
ΠA(x
∗, y∗)−ΠA(x, y∗)
= (x∗ − x)[y∗∆3v3 +∆1v1 −∆2v2]
= (x∗ − x)(r − s)[∆3{y∗(r + ǫ1 − ǫ3
r − s ) + (1− y
∗)(s+
ǫ1
r − s)} −∆2(1 +
ǫ1 − ǫ2
r − s )].
(35)
The corresponding inequality for Bob is then obtained by interchanging x and y. This
gives us the general conditions for a NE in the non-factorizable case. Note that if we set
ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 0 we recover our previous results in Eq. (20) and Eq. (21). It is also easily
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shown that this condition also implies that a = b = c = d = e = 0 and so we will recover
the factorizable payoff relation shown in Eq. (22)
A. Non-factorizable game with classical embedding
The embedding of the classical game is obtained by taking r = 1 and s = 0, which from
Eq. (35) gives the equation for NE
ΠA(x
∗, y∗)− ΠA(x, y∗)
= (x∗ − x)[∆3{y∗(1− ǫ3) + ǫ1} −∆2(1 + ǫ1 − ǫ2)]
ΠB(x
∗, y∗)− ΠB(x∗, y)
= (y∗ − y)[∆3{x∗(1− ǫ3) + ǫ1} −∆2(1 + ǫ1 − ǫ2)]. (36)
Thus we have obtained the general conditions for the NE for a non-factorizable table of
probabilities, which will embed the classical game when it becomes factorizable. The payoff
given by
ΠA(x, y) = a4 + c(a1 − a4)− d(2a4 − a2 − a3) + xy∆3(1− ǫ3)
+ x[(a2 − a4)(1− ǫ2) + ǫ1(a1 − a3)] + y[(a3 − a4)(1− ǫ2) + ǫ1(a1 − a2)] (37)
and similarly for Bob.
These produce Table VII and we see that we must have a, b, c, d, e ≥ 0.
Alice
Bob
S1
+1
−1
S′
1
+1 −1
1− a− 2b b
b a
S′
2
+1 −1
e 1− a− b− e
d+ c− e a+ b+ e− c− d
S2
+1
−1
e c+ d− e
1− a− b− e a+ b+ e− c− d
c d
d 1− c− 2d
(38)
TABLE VII: Non-factorizable probabilities that embed the classical game.
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B. The CHSH inequalities
Cereceda [43] finds the CHSH sum of correlations [4] for any set of local hidden variables
satisfying the causal communication constraint as
∆ = 2(p1 + p4 + p5 + p8 + p9 + p12 + p14 + p15 − 2). (39)
From Table VII, we can find
∆ = 4(a− c+ 2e− 1/2). (40)
Inspecting the table of probabilities, we note that a− c+2e− 1
2
∈ [−1, 1], therefore, a range
of possible ∆ ∈ [−4, 4] exist in agreement with the expected range [43]. For example, using
a = 1
2
, b = 0, c = 0, d = 1
2
, e = 1
2
, we find ∆ = 4. However, quantum mechanics enforces
extra restrictions on the joint probabilities considered here that can arise, namely Cirel’son’s
bound [44] of ∆ ∈ [−2√2, 2√2]. That is, for a physically realizable quantum game, we will
have extra restriction on the table of probabilities
|a− c + 2e− 1/2| ≤ 1/
√
2. (41)
C. Quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma constructed from non-factorizable joint proba-
bilities
For PD, we usually take [8] a1 = 3, a2 = 0, a3 = 5, and a4 = 1 in matrices (2) and the
strategy pair (x∗, y∗) = (0, 0) is a NE at which both players receive the payoffs of 1. To find
if non-factorizability permits achieving (x∗, y∗) = (1, 1) as a NE we note from Eq. (45) that
this requires
∆3(1− ǫ3 + ǫ1)−∆2(1 + ǫ1 − ǫ2) ≥ 0. (42)
Here we refer to a result in Ref. [43] giving a set of non-factorizable joint probabilities that
saturates Cirel’son’s bound, while maximally violating CHSH inequality. For this set we
have a = d = e = 1
8
(2 +
√
2) and b = c = 1
2
− 1
8
(2 +
√
2). This results in 1− ǫ3 + ǫ1 = 0 and
1 + ǫ1 − ǫ2 = 0, and we have the situation of non-factorizability giving (x∗, y∗) = (1, 1) as a
NE. From Eq. (37) we find that the payoff for each player at this NE as
ΠA(1, 1) = ΠB(1, 1) =
1
8
(18 +
√
2) = 2.42678, (43)
which is above the payoff of 1 to each player at the classical NE of (x∗, y∗) = (0, 0) and is
close to the Pareto optimum payoff of 3 for each player.
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D. Stag Hunt game with non-factorizable joint probabilities
From Eq. (36), we now have the mixed NE given by
y∗ =
∆2(1 + ǫ1 − ǫ2)
∆3
− ǫ1
1− ǫ3 , (44)
where we find (1+ ǫ1− ǫ2) ∈ [−1, 1] , ǫ1 ∈ [−1, 12 ] and 1− ǫ3 ∈ [−12 , 1], so that any mixed NE
we desire in the range [0, 1], as well as returning to the classical NE when ǫ1 = ǫ2 = ǫ3 = 0.
If we desire to produce the non-classical NE of (x∗, y∗) = (0, 1) and (x∗, y∗) = (1, 0), then
from Eq. (36) we have the conditions
ΠA(1, 0)− ΠA(x, 0) = (1− x)(∆3ǫ1 −∆2(1 + ǫ1 − ǫ2)) ≥ 0
ΠB(0, 1)−ΠB(0, y) = (1− y)(∆3ǫ1 −∆2(1 + ǫ1 − ǫ2)) ≥ 0.
(45)
We have ∆3 > ∆2 > 0 for the SH game and so we can see that if we select ǫ1 ≥ 1 + ǫ1 − ǫ2,
then we will have achieved this new NE. This condition gives ǫ2 ≥ 1 or a + b + d + e ≥ 1.
This is easily satisfied, with b = d = 1/2 with the other terms zero, for example.
E. Chicken game with non-factorizable joint probabilities
The Chicken game is defined with ∆2,∆3 < 0 whereas the SH game has ∆2,∆3 > 0.
Thus we can carry over the results from the previous section, except that the NE will invert
due to the extra minus sign in Eq. (45).
IV. DISCUSSION
Quantum versions of 2 × 2 games are developed considering the peculiarities of a set of
quantum mechanical joint probabilities. The probability sets we consider consist of normal-
ized probabilities satisfying causal communication and the symmetry constraints. Players
are allowed classical strategies only and their payoff relations are re-expressed in terms of the
joint probabilities. We allow a quantum game thus defined to reduce itself to the classical
mixed-strategy game when the set of joint probabilities can be factorized in terms of the
factorization parameters r and s. Constraints on the parameters r and s are obtained with
which this reduction can be realized.
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Non-factorizable sets of joint probabilities are introduced and appropriate parameters
ǫ1, ǫ2, and ǫ3 describing non-factorizability are identified. Quantum games are now con-
structed by retaining the obtained constraints on the parameters r and s and allowing
non-factorizability parameters ǫ1, ǫ2, and ǫ3 to take non-zero values. Two types of games
are identified: Firstly, with ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 = 0, and r = 1, s = 0, we obtain the original classical
mixed-strategy game along with its bilinear payoff structure. Secondly, while enforcing r = 1
and s = 0, but allowing non-factorizability parameters ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 to take non-zero values, we
obtain an extension of the classical mixed-strategy game in which the full original classical
game, along with its bilinear payoff structure, remains embedded when ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3 = 0. We
investigate PD within this setup to find that when Cirel’son’s bound is maximally saturated,
a non-factorizable and quantum game gives the NE of (x∗, y∗) = (1, 1) at which both play-
ers’ payoffs approach to their Pareto optimum value. For the SH we observe that two new
and non-classical NE of (x∗, y∗) = (0, 1), (1, 0) can be realized with non-factorizable joint
probabilities. We demonstrate that the our non-factorizable extension of the classical game
permits us to study situations that are not even physically realizable. That is, the situa-
tions in which the corresponding CHSH inequality is violated beyond Cirel’son’s bound. We
then obtain a constraint, given by Eq. (41), that defines the boundaries of what quantum
mechanics can permit for the extension of the original classical 2× 2 game.
Notice that the new parameters a, b, c, d and e are introduced in order to give an idea
of the extent of how much non-factorizable a given table of joint probabilities is relative
to the factorizable situation. So as to obtain compact expression, the parameters ǫ1, ǫ2, ǫ3
are then introduced, each of which depends on a, b, c, d and e. These extra parameters are
added numerically to the r and s parameters without affecting the meaning of the r and s
parameters. It turns out that r and s subsequently become redundant in our quantum game
as we set r = 1 and s = 0 in order to embed the classical game within the quantum game.
The extension of game theory based on the considerations of quantum mechanical joint
probabilities attaining the peculiar character of being non-factorizable has already been in-
vestigated in earlier publications [28, 31, 33, 35]. The present manuscript’s contribution
consists in understanding how placing an extra symmetry requirement on joint probabilities
changes the role of non-factorizability in the construction of quantum games. Using proba-
bilistic considerations only, this work explores quantum games that are constructed using an
EPR type setting. This approach gives a more accessible perspective on the nature of quan-
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tum mechanical joint probabilities and their potential exploitation in giving an extension to
game theory.
One important benefit of this extension is the extended perspective it provides of looking
at the quantum mechanical probabilities that is able to cover the classical factorizable, non-
factorizable, and even those situations that quantum mechanics does not allow, within a
single framework. Quantum mechanics is a probabilistic theory and this paper holds that
probabilistic considerations permit us to have a more clear vision and sense of what quantum
mechanics can achieve and what are its limits. From this viewpoint we give an extension to
game theory, while focussing on purely probabilistic considerations. We observe that this
extension is general enough to show us the classical factorizable situations as well as the
situations that are beyond quantum mechanics.
We are motivated to have an entirely probabilistic approach towards quantum games
that encompasses classical, quantum and also those hypothetical situations that cannot
be realized quantum mechanically. We allow players the same sets of classical strategies
so that this scheme is not subjected to Enk and Pike type argumentation. As an EPR
type apparatus is used in the playing of the two-player quantum games, their physical
realization will involve performing EPR type experiments. These experiments are agreed to
entail genuinely quantum features. The sets of joint probabilities, whose non-factorizable
property we use in constructing our quantum games, are relevant to generalized EPR type
experiments.
The potential benefits of this approach consists of developing an entirely probabilistic
understanding of multi-party strategic situations. In these situations, quantum probabili-
ties become crucial in achieving one or the other outcome. The extension of game theory
advocated in this paper, rather than being imaginary, is simply a more generic framework,
that allows us to consider, in entirely probabilistic terms, also that peculiar domain which
resides beyond the bounds of quantum mechanics. We find that, within our probabilis-
tic approach toward quantum games, this domain becomes more easily identifiable, along
with easily recognizable classical factorizable and the quantum mechanical non-factorizable
domains.
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